The great Mali

Mali



//SOURCE// http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/4chapter3.shtml


ORIGINS

"Mali guards its secrets jealously. There are things which the uninitiated will never know, for the griots, their depositories, will never betray them."
Oral history, recited by Malian djeli (or oral historian) Mamadou Kouyate.

Mali emerged against the back-drop of a declining of Ghana under the dynamic leadership of Sundiata of the Keita clan. But the region he took over had a past rich in trade and powerful rulers.


JENNE

There was also the city of Jenne-Jeno (ancient Jenne), which archaeologists have now established was first settled in 200 BC, and only began losing its pre-eminence in the 12th century. Between whiles, it was a vital crossroads in the north-south trade. Recent excavations reveal high levels of craftsmanship in pottery, iron-work and jewellery making. This suggests the people of Jenne imported iron ore, stone grinders and beads.

SUNDIATA THE HERO "He was a lad full of strength; his arms had the strength of ten and his biceps inspired fear in his companions. He had already that authoritative way of speaking which belongs to those who are destined to command." SOUMAORO THE VILLAIN "Since his accession to the throne of Sosso, he had defeated nine kings whose heads served him as objects in his macabre chamber. Their skins served as seats and he cut his footwear from human skin." Taken from The Epic of Old Mali, recited by the griot (oral historian) Djeli Mamadou Kouyate, edited by D. T. Niane.

CONSOLIDATION
Sundiata Keita rose to power by defeating the king of the Sosso - Soumaoro (Sumanguru), known as the Sorcerer King, in 1235. He then brought all the Mandinke clans rulers (or Mansas) under his leadership, declaring himself overall Mansa. He took Timbuktu from the Tuareg, transforming it into a substantial city, a focus for trade and scholarship.

A significant portion of the wealth of the Empire derived from the Bure goldfields. The first capital, Niani, was built close to this mining area.

Mali at its largest was 2,000 kilometres wide. It extended from the coast of West Africa, both above the Senegal River and below the Gambia River, taking in old Ghana, and reaching south east to Gao and north east to Tadmekka.

LAND
Gold was not its only mainstay. Mali also acquired control over the salt trade. The capital of Niani was situated on the agriculturally rich floodplain of upper Niger, with good grazing land further north. A class of professional traders emerged in Mali. Some were of Mandinka origin, others were Bambara, Soninke and later Dyula. Gold dust and agricultural produce was exported north. In the 14th century, cowrie shells were established as a form of currency for trading and taxation purposes.

ZENITH

Mali reached its peak in the 14th century. Three rulers stand out in this period. The first one, Abubakar II, goes down in history as the king who wanted to cross the Atlantic Ocean.

MALI DISCOVERS AMERICA?

"So Abubakar equipped 200 ships filled with men and the same number equipped with gold, water, and provisions, enough to last them for years…they departed and a long time passed before anyone came back. Then one ship returned and we asked the captain what news they brought. He said, 'Yes, Oh Sultan, we travelled for a long time until there appeared in the open sea a river with a powerful current…the other ships went on ahead, but when they reached that place, they did not return and no more was seen of them…As for me, I went about at once and did not enter the river.' The Sultan got ready 2,000 ships, 1,000 for himself and the men whom he took with him, and 1,000 for water and provisions. He left me to deputise for him and embarked on the Atlantic Ocean with his men. That was the last we saw of him and all those who were with him. And so, I became king in my own right." Mansa Musa, talking to Syrian scholar Al-Umari. Click here to listen to Malian praise singer Sadio Diabate, singing about Abubakar II

Abubakar II's successor, Mansa Musa (1312-1337) was immortalised in the descriptions of Arab writers, when he made his magnificent pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324.

MANSA MUSA'S PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA
"It is said that he brought with him 14,000 slave girls for his personal service. The members of his entourage proceeded to buy Turkish and Ethiopia slave girls, singing girls and garments, so that the rate of the gold dinar fell by six dirhams. Having presented his gift he set off with the caravan."
Cairo born historian al-Maqurizi.

Mansa Musa also spent his wealth to more permanent effect. He commissioned the design and construction of a number of stunning buildings, for example, the building of the mosques at Gao and Jenne. At Niani he was responsible for the construction of a fantastic cupola for holding an audience in. Timbuktu became a place of great learning with young men linked to Fez in the north.

The other famous Malian ruler was Mansa Suleiman. Less is known of him. The historian Ibn Khaldun describes the considerable gifts he assembled for a Sultan in the north. But Ibn Battuta criticises his meanness.

IBN BATTUTA TAKES ON MANSA SULEIMAN

On arriving in Mali, Ibn Battuta does not mince his words. "He is a miserly king, not much giving is to be expected from him. It happened that I stayed this period and did not seen him because of my sickness…" Finally Mansa Suleiman sends Ibn Battuta a gift, but it is definitely not up to Ibn Battuta's standards. "Behold - three circular pieces of bread, a piece of beef fried in gharti, and a calabash of sour milk. When I saw them, I laughed and wondered a lot…" So he complains. "I stood before the sultan and said to him, 'I have indeed travelled in the lands of the world. I have met their kings. I have been in your country four months and you have given me no hospitality and not given me anything. What shall I say about you before the Sultans?" And that does the trick. Mansa Suleiman claims that he had not even realised Ibn Battuta was in town and hastily makes amends for the previous omissions in hospitality. "Then the Sultan ordered a house for me in which I stayed and he fixed an allowance for me…He was gracious to me at my departure, to the extent of giving me one hundred mitqals of gold."

RELIGION

The court of Mali converted to Islam after Sundiata. As in Ghana, Muslim scribes played an important role in government and administration. But traditional religion persisted. Arab historians make much of the Islamic influence in Mali, whereas oral historians place little emphasis on Islam in their histories.

GOLD

The relationship between the Mansas of Mali and the people who worked on the gold fields is worth noting. The rulers received taxes from the miners in the form of gold, but they never exercised direct control over the mining process. At one point, the miners stopped working when the Mansas tried to convert them to Islam.

A HISTORIAN COMPARES ANCIENT MALI TO ANCIENT GHANA

"To some aspect they look the same, the gold, the way they made trade. But to the opposite of Ghana, I think Mali was really able to have more territory beyond some of the area Ghana went to, like Taghaza, the salt gulf, that was all part of the empire of Mali. So territorial position was one of the greatest differences between Ghana and Mali. And also, the kind of ties Mali was able to make with peoples outside of Africa, is one of the great differences between the two empires…Mali was much much more international than Ghana was." Tereba Togola, Head of Archaeology at the Institute of Human Sciences, Bamako. He is responsible for all archaeological research in Mali. Click here to listen to Dr. Tereba Togola

DECLINE OF MALI

A combination of weak and ineffective rulers and increasingly aggressive raids by Mossi neighours and Tuareg Berbers gradually reduced the power of Mali. In the east, Gao began its ascendancy while remaining part of the Mali Empire.

In the early 1400's, Tuareg launched a number of successful raids on Timbuktu. They did not disrupt scholastic life or commercial activity, but fatally undermined the government by appropriating taxes for themselves.

Meanwhile Gao had become the capital of the burgeoning Songhay Empire which, by 1500, had totally eclipsed Mali. But the idea of Mali regaining its former splendour and glory, remained strong in the minds of many Mandinka for generations to come.

SALIF KEITA

One of the most internationally famous Malians today is musician Salif Keita. He is the descendant of Mansa Sundiata, born into a noble but poor family. His decision to become a musician was very much frowned upon by his family, since music was the province of a lower caste, the djelis. Click here to listen to an excerpt of Salif Keita, singing Tekere, a song about applauding griots, musicians and Malians

MALINKE

PRONUNCIATION: mah-LING-kay

ALTERNATE NAMES: Mandinka; Maninka; Manding; Mandingo; Mandin; Mande

LOCATION: Territory covering The Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra     Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

POPULATION: 1.5 million

LANGUAGE: Variations of Mande languages

RELIGION: Islam

1 • INTRODUCTION

Liberia's population of over 2 million steadily declined in the 1990s. During the 1989–96 civil war, as many as two hundred thousand people died and another seven hundred thousand became refugees. Liberia's population consists of over two dozen ethnic groups, which fall into three main language groups: Kru (east and southeast), Mel (northwest), and Mande (north and far west). The Malinke are a Mande-speaking group.
The Malinke are also commonly referred to as Mandinka, Maninka, Manding, Mandingo, Mandin, and Mande. They live in areas of sub-Saharan Africa that have a history of agricultural settlements dating as far back as 7,000 years.
The Malinke are heirs to the great Mali Empire, a medieval merchant empire that flourished from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century and greatly influenced the history of western Africa. Malinke territories in the northern region of Africa were brought under Muslim control in the eleventh century. The renowned city of Islamic teaching, Timbuctu, was also part of the vast and prosperous Mali Empire. The empire declined in the fifteenth century and was gradually absorbed by the Songhai Kingdom, which extended to the seventeenth century.
As early as 1444, Portuguese traders had enslaved the first Malinke people, and in the next three and a half centuries, thousands of Malinke and other peoples were transported by Portuguese, British, French, and Dutch merchants to the Caribbean and the Americas to work as slaves on plantations. During the nineteenth century the kingdoms of the Malinke peoples were subjugated by the British, French, and Portuguese and were incorporated into their colonial systems.
The Malinke people gained some popular attention when American author Alex Haley published his best-selling book, Roots (1974), later made into a television series. The story of Haley's ancestral family and the book's main character, Kunta Kinte of the Mandinka (Malinke) people, personalized the terrible plight of African slaves and their families who were sold into slavery.
The Malinke were not only victims of the slave trade, but they were also perpetrators of the institution, having had a long history of owning and maintaining slaves. There were two distinct kinds of slaves to be found: those who had been captured in battle or purchased; and those who had been born into the slave families of their village. The indigenous slave trade persisted into the nineteenth century.

2 • LOCATION

Today there are more than 1.5 million Malinke distributed over several African nations within a wide arc that extends 800 miles (1,300 kilometers). The region starts at the mouth of the Gambia River in the northwest and circles around in a bow form, ending in the Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) in the southeast. The territory includes areas in the nations of The Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire. There are numerous other African ethnic groups sharing these areas.

3 • LANGUAGE

The Malinke peoples speak slight variations of the broad Mande branch of the Niger-Congo family of languages. The term "Mande" frequently refers to a group of closely related languages spoken by the Malinke and other west African peoples such as the Bambara, the Soninke, and the Dyula.

4 • FOLKLORE

Details of the early days of the Mali Empire and the lifestyles of the people have been kept alive for centuries through the epic poem, Sonjara (or Sundiata ; also Sunjata ), which has been sung for generations by the griots , bards or praise-singers of West Africa. In over 3,000 lines of poetry in the oral tradition, the epic tells the story of Sonjara, a legendary leader who, after countless obstacles and trials, unites the Malinke clans and chiefdoms at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Sonjara is unable to walk as a child because of a spell put on him by his father's jealous second wife. Sonjara finally learns to walk and becomes a hunter, giving up his claim to the throne during a long exile with his mother and siblings. A delegation from Mali comes to him and begs him to return and save them from an evil sorcerer-king, Sumanguru. Sonjara organizes an army to regain his throne. With help from his sister, who seduces Sumanguru in order to learn his weaknesses, and after many bloody battles, Sonjara's army defeats the forces of Sumanguru.

5 • RELIGION

The majority of the Malinke are Muslim (followers of Islam) and have adapted the teachings of Islam into their native beliefs. Most Malinke villages have a mosque. Women sit separate from the men, both in the mosque and during outside religious services. Those villagers who have made the hajj(pilgrimage) to Mecca, or even descendants of those who have made the journey, are highly respected.
The principal religious leader is the elected imam, an elder who leads prayers at the mosques and has great religious knowledge. The other Islamic clerics who play major roles as healers and religious counselors are the marabouts . They are respected as preservers of morality through oral tradition and teachers of the Koran (sacred text of Islam). They are perceived to be experts at preventing and healing ailments or injuries inflicted by mortals or those that are believed to have been inflicted by evil spirits.

6 • MAJOR HOLIDAYS

The favorite is Muslim holiday is Tabaski, which usually falls in the spring or summer, the day being determined according to the Islamic lunar calendar. Tabaski commemorates the moment when Abraham was about to sacrifice his son Isaac in obedience to God's command, when God interceded and provided a ram instead. It is prestigious to have a very large and fat ram to slaughter for the holiday. On this day people attend the mosque, and there is much eating (especially roasted mutton) and visiting of friends. Other religious holidays include the Feast of Ramadan celebrated at the end of the annual thirty-day Muslim fast, and Muhammad's birthday.

7 • RITES OF PASSAGE

A week after the birth of an infant, the Malinke hold a name-giving ceremony. A marabout leads prayers during the ceremony, shaves the infant's head, and announces the name of the child for the first time.
Puberty rites and circumcision are very significant in the lives of the Malinke, both male and female. It is the most important rite of passage, for one cannot attain adulthood or marry without it. For boys the rite is held about once every five years and includes novices from six to thirteen years old, who may be in a group of thirty to forty-five boys. Boys are kept secluded for six to eight weeks of instruction before circumcision.
Girls are circumcised in smaller groups, and the ceremonies occur more frequently. The girls stay secluded for ten days to two weeks. During this time they are taught Malinke values and how to work together as a group. In recent years there has been pressure to conduct female circumcisions in clinics or to stop them altogether. In general, however, the older generation is very reluctant to let go of these traditional rituals.
Marriage for a Malinke girl may begin with her betrothal at birth to a boy who may be as old as twelve. The preferred marriage arrangement is for a betrothal between a boy and his mother's brother's daughter. Prior to marriage, the suitor makes several payments of a bride price (including money, kola nuts, salt, and some livestock) to the parents of the prospective bride. The typical Malinke wedding, called a "bride transfer," takes place on a Thursday or Friday—the two holiest days of the week.
For funerals, a corpse is ritually bathed and buried on its right side, head facing east, feet to the north. A fence is built around the grave to protect it from animals; sticks are put over the hole. During the next forty-five days, three mortuary ceremonies are held at which oil cakes and kola nuts are distributed to those attending.

8 • RELATIONSHIPS

When the Malinke encounter a family member or friend, an extensive ritual exchange of formal greeting questions can take up to a minute. They might say, "Peace be with you," "Is your life peaceful?", "How is everything going?", "Are your family members in good health?", "How is your father?", or "Is the weather treating your crops well?" The questions go back and forth and may end with, "Thanks be to Allah." Even if one is not feeling well or if things are not going well, the answers are usually positive. It is considered very bad manners not to engage in the lengthy greeting exchange.
If a guest drops by at mealtime, he or she will surely be invited to share the meal. Those who have been blessed by Allah (God) with wealth are expected to share some of theirs with others.

9 • LIVING CONDITIONS

The Malinke who live in the cities have adapted to an urban lifestyle. Most, however, still live in traditional villages of anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand people. The villages are rather compact, consisting of groups of compounds enclosed by millet-stalk fences. A compound contains several cylindrical houses built of sun-baked bricks or wattle and daub, with a thatched roof; there will also be a granary and a separate cylindrical kitchen with low half-walls and a thatched roof. Houses are grouped around a center courtyard that may contain a well.
For transportation, a bicycle, an occasional motorbike, an ox cart, or a horse cart are used by those who can afford them. More frequently, villagers walk to catch a bus or perhaps share a taxi, or they simply walk to their destination. Women do not have much opportunity to leave their villages, and travel for women is discouraged by the Malinke culture.

10 • FAMILY LIFE

The Malinke consider large families to be important. A large compound with brothers and their wives will always be bustling with family members of several generations and children of many ages. The Malinke practice polygyny (multiple wives), and Islam permits men to take up to four wives. The expensive bride price and the fact that society requires that all wives be provided for equally means that only prosperous men can afford several wives.
Women are always busy with some kind of work, while it is common to see men sitting under a tree in the village square, chatting with other men and having a smoke and some tea. The household heads have the authority to make all important decisions, although women wield significant power behind the scenes.
The social organization of the Malinke is based on an ancient caste (class) system into which members are born. A Malinke can never change the caste-status into which he or she is born. There is rarely marriage between individuals of different castes. In an average village, however, the differences in wealth or status among the castes is barely visible. The size of the family is often more of an indication of wealth; small families with few children and few extended family members are thought of as poor and unfortunate.

11 • CLOTHING

Today, Malinke who live in urban centers, especially the men, may have adopted Western-style clothes. Villagers, on the other hand, take pride in their traditional clothing, which is important to them. In fact, one of the obligations of a husband is to give each wife the cloth for at least two new outfits every year.
Women generally wear a loose, scoop-necked smock over a long skirt made by a wrap-around piece of cloth. They often tie a matching piece of cloth around their head in an informal turban, each woman's turban having its own special flair. They use brightly colored cotton prints with splashy, large designs; some also wear tie-dyed, wood-block, or batik prints. The traditional casual dress for men is made with the same bright prints fashioned in an outfit that resembles pajamas.
For formal occasions men and women may wear the grand boubou . For women this is a loose dress that extends to ground level and may be trimmed in lace or embroidery. For men it is a long robe-like garment covering long pants and a shirt. Many middle-aged or elder men wear knit caps. Shoes are leather or rubber thongs.

12 • FOOD

Traditional Malinke are cultivators who grow varieties of millet, sorghum, rice (in the swampy areas), and corn as staple crops. As cash crops they grow peanuts and cotton, and to supplement their diet and gain a bit of income, they grow diverse vegetables in garden plots. Some villages have a bakery where small loaves of French-style bread are baked.
The wealthier Malinke own some livestock—cattle, goats, chickens, and perhaps a horse for plowing. The cattle are used for milk and for the prestige of owning them; they are rarely slaughtered. There is little meat in the diet. Those who live near rivers or lakes may supplement their meals with fish.
A typical breakfast might consist of corn porridge eaten with a spoon made of a small, elongated calabash (gourd) split in half. The midday and evening meals may consist of rice or couscous with sauce (often peanut) and/or vegetables. Couscous can be made of pounded and steamed millet, sorghum, or cornmeal.
Tea-time is an important break for the Malinke. Tea is made by filling a small pot with dried tea leaves and covering these with boiling water. The brewed tea is extremely strong and is served with several small spoons of sugar in tiny glasses. After the first round of tea, the pot is filled with boiling water a second and third time, thus the second and third rounds of tea are a bit diminished in strength.

13 • EDUCATION

Many villages today have a government school as well aa a Koranic (Islamic) school for learning to recite verses from the Koran. The educational model of the government schools is based on those of the ex-colonial masters, either French or British. Since the nations where the Malinke are found today have many other tribal peoples, it is likely that the school teachers are of a different ethnic group and do not speak the Malinke language. Further, instruction is often in French of English, making it difficult for Malinke children.
Poor attendance and high drop-out rates are common in the village schools. Muslim parents often do not think it is as important for their daughters to get an education as it is for their sons, so the enrollment of boys is much higher than that of girls. Only a small percentage of the village pupils pass the state examination at the end of sixth grade in order to go on to high school. In the countries where the Malinke live, generally less than half the population is able to read and write.

14 • CULTURAL HERITAGE

Much of the cultural heritage of the Malinke is embedded in the great Mali merchant empire of the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries and the Islamic religion that was adopted by the chieftains. There was a flourishing trade in gold, and many ornate ornaments, jewelry, and staffs of gold date from that period. Additionally, the cultural heritage has been immortalized in the famous epic poem Sonjara , sung by minstrels since the thirteenth century ( see Folklore).

15 • EMPLOYMENT

Farming is a respected occupation, and all members of society are given farming tasks. The children, too, guard the fields against wild boar, monkeys, and birds. The Malinke use natural fertilizer, allowing livestock to graze on the fields lying fallow; and children are often seen tending the livestock Men do the plowing, sowing, planting, and a major part of the harvesting work. Some also engage in hunting and fishing. Women do weeding and tend vegetable plots.

16 • SPORTS

Boys might be seen playing soccer with a homemade ball. They enjoy listening to soccer matches, both national and international, on the radio, or watching matches on television in town; many Malinke men and boys can recite the names of international soccer stars.

17 • RECREATION

In addition to the storytelling and music provided by the griots, the Malinke like to listen to the radio. For those living in villages with electricity, a television set is a prized item. It is common for large groups of villagers to gather at the home of the television's owner.
Woaley is a board game similar to back-gammon. It is a major pastime for the Malinke as well as for other West Africans. The board is in the form of a rectangle with twelve indentations to hold beans, and two larger indentations at the ends to hold the captured beans. Both spectators and players of all ages enjoy woaley matches. (The game is referred to by many other names—such as mancala , and is played all over the world in slight variations.)

18 • CRAFTS AND HOBBIES

Present-day hobbies of Malinke young men include such things as collecting cassette tapes of their favorite singers (such as reggae singers from Jamaica or American rock stars). Young women enjoy braiding each other's hair, making decorative rows or braiding in long strands of synthetic hair.

19 • SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Since the Malinke are socialized with a strong sense of responsibility to their family and lineage, many of the social problems that are prevalent in industrialized society are not encountered. AIDS and the spread of venereal diseases by men who have brought these back from urban areas is a problem in some places. There is malnutrition and a lack of understanding of its causes. Some people view the situation of women as a social problem. Women have fewer opportunities for education, fewer rights, and share a husband with co-wives.

20 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Haley, Alex. Roots. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976.
McNaughton, Patrick R. The Mande Blacksmiths: Knowledge, Power, and Art in West Africa. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988.
Moss, Joyce, and George Wilson. Africans South of the Sahara . 1st ed. Detroit: Gale Research, 1991.
Sallah, Tijan M. Wolof. New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 1996.

Read more: Malinke - Introduction, Location, Language, Folklore, Religion, Major holidays, Rites of passage, Relationships, Living conditions http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Japan-to-Mali/Malinke.html#b#ixzz22bvXxQ3t

Mali Empire

 Rise and Origins:
The founders of the (Manding, Mansa) Mali Empire in West Africa were the Mandinka people. The heartland of the ancient Mali Empire was the plateau between the upper Niger and the Senegal rivers (see map), in the area now within the borders of the modern republic of Mali. At its height in the 14th century A.D. the empire covered an area of more than 24,000 square kilometres.

The Mandingo speaking peoples of the modern states of The Gambia, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Liberia all trace their cultural origins to the Empire of Manding from where their ancestors migrated centuries ago. During the height ofGhana's power the Mandinka lived in scattered villages ruled by village chiefs. Mandinka political unity was brought about by a racial reaction against the oppressive rule of Sumanguru Kante, the Serahule ruler who conquered Mandinka territory after he had established his rule in Kumbi. It was when the scattered Mandingo community came together to resist the oppressive rule of Sumanguru Kante, that the insurgent Mandinka found a national hero inMakhara Makhang Konate, otherwise known as Sunjatta Keita.

Sunjatta was invited by the people of Manding to lead them into war and regain his throne earning his surname Keita which in Mandinka means "to take inheritance". Sunjatta raised a strong army and in 1234 triumphantly entered Jeriba, the capital of Kangaba, and seized the throne. With the defeat of Sumanguru Kante by Sunjatta's forces at the famous battle of Kirina in 1235 the Mali Empire was born. 

At its greatest extent, which was during Sunjatta's lifetime and just shortly after his death, the Manding claimed an immense territory stretching from the edge of the Sahara to the forests of the south in what now comprises the republic of Liberia and Sierra Leone. From east to west, it claimed all the region between Takedda beyond the Niger Buckle covering Senegambia on the Atlantic Ocean. Sunjatta died in 1255 in mysterious circumstances. 

Sujatta's immediate successor was his son Mansa Waliwho reigned for 15 years from 1255 to 1270 and is said to be one of the greatest kings of the Mali Empire. 

 Reign of Mansa Musa:
The best known ruler known to the Arabs and the mostfamous outside the Arab world was Mansa Kankan Musa. Mansa Musa reigned from 1312 to 1337 during its golden age. He consolidated the foundations laid down by Sunjatta and ruled the empire at its greatest height. By the time of his reign Islam had become firmly established among the ruling classes of Mali. It was the emperor's pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 that put the empire on the map. He travelled with thousands of porters and servants carrying lots of gold with him. During his stay in Egypt on his way to Mecca he spent and gave away so much gold that there was a devaluation of the local currency and it sparked an inflationary crisis in Egypt as well as depressing world prices of the commodity. As a result of this rather extravagant display of wealth his fame spread as far as Europe where the Catalan map by Abraham Cresques of about 1375 shows "Mussa Melli" seated on a gold throne wearing a gold crown while holding a gold nugget, describing him as "The riches and most noble king in all the land".

During the time of his reign Mansa Musa also became famous for his work in the fields of politics, commerce and Islam. In the field of politics he extended the borders of Mali even much further and set up a more effective system of government than any of the earlier kings of Mali. Mansa Musa's administration of justice was relatively impartial and in the field of diplomacy he was able to establish friendly relationships with other African states such as Morocco and Egypt. Much of the eyewitness accounts of life in 14th century Manding is derived from the memoirs of Ibn Battuta, an Arab traveller who's Rihla memoirs give a wealth of observation and detail about Mali. Another famous North African scholar, Ibn Khaldun, recorded that "there were diplomatic relations and exchanges of gifts between Mansa Musa and the Contemporary king of Morocco, Sultan Abu-Hassan and that high-ranking statesmen of the two kingdoms were exchanged as ambassadors". 

To help the king in his work, he had judges, scribes and civil servants. These people helped him to strengthen the administrative machinery of the Empire. There were at least 14 provinces in Mali including the province of Manding proper where the the kings' capital of Niani was situated. Most of the provinces were ruled by governors who were usually famous generals. Others, such as the Berber provinces, were governed by their own Sheikhs. Some of the important commercial centres also had governors of their own. All these provincial administrators were responsible to the Mansa, and they were all said to be well paid. The king also regularly invited and dealt with complaints and appeals against injustices perpetrated by the governors. All this elaborate machinery of government was expensive to run, and the Mali kings had the usual sources of income through taxes collected on crops and livestock, tolls tribute from vassal states, trade taxes and proceeds from royal estates.

The Mali Empire enjoyed not only stability and good government under Mansa Musa but also commercial prosperity. As both the salt-producing regions and the gold districts came under her control, Mali was able to attract traders from the north as well as from the south of the empire. His team of governors and strong army were able to maintain order even among the turbulent Berbers of the South-Western regions of the Sahara, so that traders and travellers could move to and fro with a sense of security. In this way commerce became very brisk and traders from different lands such as Egypt and Morocco could be found in the commercial towns.

Mansa Musa and his generals were able to captureWalata, a famous commercial centre built by merchants from Ghana as well as Timbuktu (also spelt Tombouctou), a small town to the north of Mali, which began life as a Berber seasonal camp but would grow into a great commercial and educational centre of the Western Sudan.

 The Economy:
The main commercial centres were its capital Niani, Timbuktu and Gao which later became the capital of Songhai. The major caravan routes terminated at Niani and other commercial staging posts, and defending them was one of the major functions of the empire. Copper, gold, salt, and kola nuts were pivotal to Mali’s economy. After the reign of Sunjatta, Mali became the world’s largest producer of gold. 

Ibn Khaldun described the empire's capital as "an extensive place with cultivated land fed by running water, with an active population, busy markets and at the time, station for trading caravans from Morocco, Tripoli and Egypt".  However, the commercial centres of Timbuktu and Gao to the north of Niani were even more commercially active. The medium of exchange for trade in was the white shells known as cowries, though the system of barter was also practised. 

 Spread of Islam & Literacy:
One of the main things that gave fame to Mansa Musa was his work in the field of Islam. Mansa Musa was himself a very pious Muslim and wanted to use Islam for the spiritual well being of his people. He devoted a great deal of his time purifying, strengthening and spreading Islam in Mali, especially after his famous pilgrimage to Mecca. After his pilgrimage to Mecca he returned to Mali filled with a determination to purify and strengthen Islam, to promote Islamic education and to introduce some of the new things he had seen on his journey.

As a pious Muslim Musa made the end of Ramadan a national ceremony and built imposing mosques in several cities.  He also gave generous patronage to Muslim scholars to encourage them in their study and teaching of the Islamic sciences. The Sankore mosque built in Timbuktu became an internationally known centre of scholarship, equivalent to the Medieval universities of Europe. This had a number of practical advantages. Literacy in Arabic facilitated the transaction of government business and also improved political and commercial dealings with North Africa.

 Architecture:
Musa's contact with North Africa brought important developments in the field of architecture. On his return from his hajj in Mecca, he was accompanied by a Spanish poet and architect from Andalusia named El-Saheli. El-Saheli built the king a distinguished palace in Timbuktu as well as a number of Mosques in Manding cities including the mud brick Djingareiber Mosque for which he was paid 200 kg of gold. The architectural styles introduced by El-Saheli were new to the Mandinkas as he introduced the flat roof of North Africa, the pyramidal minaret and the use of burnt bricks. These designs were to later influence architecture in the Western Sudan.

USA hands off Mali!

By the Defenders for Freedom, Justice & Equality – Richmond, Virginia, USA

Recent developments in the West African Republic of Mali are raising serious concerns about the possibility of yet another U.S. intervention. On March 22, one month before a scheduled presidential election, a military coup toppled the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure. Quickly taking sides, the regional 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded that the coup leaders restore civilian rule. On March 26, the U.S. cut off all military aid to the impoverished country.

On April 1, coup leader Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, who has received military training in the U.S. (1) and who is charging massive corruption by civilian political leaders, said he had reinstated the country's constitution and government institutions and would begin consultations to form a transitional government, which would be “responsible for organizing peaceful, free, open and democratic elections in which we will not participate.” Those national consultations were to begin April 5 in the capital city of Bamako.
That was not enough for ECOWAS, an economic and military bloc with ties to the U.S. Meeting April 2 in Dakar, Senegal, the alliance's members closed their countries' borders with land-locked Mali and imposed severe sanctions, including cutting off access to the regional bank, raising the possibility that Mali will soon be unable to pay for essential supplies, including gasoline. 
Meeting the following day in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the 54-member African Union imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on Capt. Sanogo and his associates. Also on April 3, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting on the Mali crisis and declared its support for ECOWAS' efforts “to restore order in Mali. U.N. political affairs chief Lynn Pascoe told the council on Tuesday that ECOWAS had placed some 3,000 troops on standby to deal with the coup and rebellion in Mali.” (2)
Roots of the coup
What sparked the coup was the central government's inability to deal with the rebellion now under way in northern Mali, a region populated by the Tuareg, an ethnically Berber, nomadic people who eke out a living in the inhospitable desert. Long-standing grievances of neglect by the government have led many Tuaregs to despair of reform.
The simmering resentment came to a head in January after the U.S.-led bombing of Libya and the overthrow of that country's government. Around 2,000 Tuaregs who had been employed as soldiers by the Libyan government returned to Mali, heavily armed and with uncertain prospects of finding jobs or arable land. A rebellion broke out, one the government was in no position to counter, provoking a mutiny by angry rank-and-file Malian soldiers who chased President Touré into hiding. The Tuareg rebellion sharply escalated March 30, when rebels seized control of three key cities, including the legendary cultural and trading center of Timbuktu. 
The armed rebels who now control all northern cities have several factions. One wing is demanding independence for the north. Another says its goal is to create an Islamic republic operating under strict Sharia law – which might be all of Mali or simply the northern half, which this faction is calling Azawad. The conflict has reportedly driven some 100,000 people as refugees into neighboring countries, while internally displacing more than 90,000.
Meanwhile, important independent forces within Mali and in the sub-region are calling for an end to outside pressure and a peaceful resolution to both the coup and the rebellion.
Will the U.S. intervene?
What raises concerns about a possible U.S. role are the important geopolitical position that Mali occupies, the fact that the U.S. military is already in the country and the presence of known oil reserves under the desert sands of northern Mali.
Mali is strategically located between the Arab African north and the Black African south. This largely Muslim country borders seven other countries: (clockwise from the northeast) Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote-d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. This makes Mali of interest to the U.S., which seeks to counter the growing Chinese economic presence in Africa. (China is now Mali's largest export trading partner.)
Under the umbrella of its Africa Command, or AFRICOM, the U.S. has been systematically developing ties with the militaries of African countries, including Mali. Washington annually contributes about $140 million to Mali, half of it supposedly for humanitarian purposes, the other half to support “development” and the Malian military, an organization of just 7,000 soldiers. The U.S. State Department handpicks Malian officers for special training in the U.S.
Over the past few months, almost every incoming flight to Bamako has brought a dozen U.S. soldiers, obvious by their haircuts and by the greeting party that usually includes a couple of men in U.S. army uniform. (3) No one will say how many U.S. military personnel are based in Mali, but there is no doubt that AFRICOM sees Mali as highly strategic to its goals in Africa.
In February 2008, AFRICOM representatives participated in a five-day “Strategic Level Seminar” held in Bamako and sponsored by ECOWAS. According to AFRICOM's website, “The seminar focused on the training needs of ECOWAS member states in the area of peace support operations.” (4) In other words, regional military cooperation. Further, “West African leaders' perspectives concerning their regional environment focused overwhelmingly on human security issues, rather than the state-versus-state competition that has been the hallmark of international politics.” (5) So this was a meeting to discuss internal security issues, like popular unrest and rebellions. Among the speakers at the seminar was U.S. Army Gen. William E. “Kip” Ward, AFRICOM's commander. The seminar was co-sponsored by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, an outfit funded by the U.S. Defense Department. (4)
Then there's the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a “multi-faceted, multi-year U.S. Government (USG) program created to promote regional military cooperation among governments in the 'Pan-Sahel'” region, including Mali. (6)
In 2010, there was Exercise Flintlock 10, a “special operations forces exercise, conducted by Special Operations Command Africa with participation of key European nations,” focusing on “military interoperability and capacity-building with partner nations throughout the Trans-Saharan region of Africa.” (7)
In February 2012, there was Atlas Accord 12, an “annual-joint-aerial-delivery exercise, hosted by U.S. Army Africa,” which “brings together U.S. Army personnel with militaries in Africa to enhance air drop capabilities and ensure effective delivery of military resupply materials and humanitarian aid.” (8) This took place while the Tuareg rebellion was unfolding in the north.
The Africa Command had planned to hold Flintlock 2012 in Mali last month, but canceled because of theinsurgency. The exercise was supposed to bring together security forces from West Africa, Europe and the U.S to coordinate “counterterrorism” missions. (1)
From empire to colony to neocolony
For centuries, present-day Mali was the center of the mighty Mali-Sonrai Empire, with a land area larger than Europe, important gold mines and a full-time army to defend its borders. By the 19th century, however, the central power had been greatly weakened and between 1880 and 1916 the region was colonized by France, which took over scarce farmland for cotton production.
When they were finally forced out of Africa in 1960, the French left behind desperately poor countries. Today Mali remains the 23rd poorest country on earth, with the 49th lowest life expectancy – barely 53 years. It is one of eight countries currently facing drought and severe food shortages in the Sahel, the vast region that forms the southern edge of the Sahara Desert.
A country of 14.5 million people, Mali is a study in contradictions. Twice the size of Texas, it is one of Africa's largest but least populated countries. Rich in deposits of gold, phosphates, kaolin and salt, its people have an annual per capita purchasing power of just $1,300. Less than 4 percent of its land is capable of growing irrigated crops. It has the world's third highest birth rate and the third highest infant mortality. Just 56 percent of its people have access to decent drinking water and all of them face a high risk of contracting malaria and waterborne diseases. Less than half the population can read and write, with few receiving more than an elementary school education. With no oil or gas production of its own, the country is dependent on others for its energy needs. Total annual spending by the federal government is $2.6 billion. (Virginia's budget, with half Mali's population, currently is $41.7 billion. One particular legacy of colonialism is the desperately poor condition of the Tuareg, who along with Moors make up about 10 percent of the population.
It has been known for decades that vast oil deposits likely lie beneath the sands of the northern desert regions – a fact that has been elaborately denied by successive U.S. ambassadors, although the oil deposits had been predicted in the 1950s by French geologists.
In February of this year, two foreign companies signed oil and gas exploration deals with the Malian government “that oblige them to invest millions of US dollars in the search of petroleum in the country's vast desert. Both Algeria's national oil company SONATRACH and the Canadian owned Selier Energy say that the vast Taoudeni basin, at Mali's borders with Mauritania and Algeria, shows great potential for major oil and gas discoveries.” (9) In a world hungry for energy resources, who will get control of these reserves? U.S. strategists are fearful of China’s growing influence, adding competition to greed as motives to control the area.
In crisis, U.S. sees opportunity
It's not hard to see how Washington would view the present crisis as an opportunity to gain control, directly or indirectly, of this important African country. The U.S., along with most European countries, has condemned the March 22 coup, but has made no mention of the grievances of the Tuareg. (Coups themselves are not universally condemned by the U.S., which not only did not condemn, but is strongly suspected of being behind, the June 2009 coup against progressive Honduran President Manuel Zelaya.) 
Regional economic sanctions will inevitably weaken Mali’s government, making it even less able to provide for the needs of the Malian people, including the Tuareg. Inevitably, there will be calls for the U.S. to intervene – for purely humanitarian reasons, of course. We have seen this pattern before, in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti and in many other countries. With its listening base in Tessalit near the Algerian border and its February Atlas Accord exercise on airlifting humanitarian relief, the U.S. is well-positioned to start flying military aircraft into northern Mali, giving it “boots on the ground,” with a cover.
We believe that the U.S. military has no legitimate role to play in any other country, especially those formerly colonized and exploited by the Western powers. Humanitarian aid should be managed by the United Nations, not by the Pentagon. Neither does the U.S government have the right to impose sanctions on other countries, whether it be Cuba, Iran or Mali. Only the people of Mali have the right to decide their own destiny. This is the simple right of oppressed peoples to self-determination.
We say: U.S. Hands Off Mali! No Troops, No Sanctions, No Interference of Any Kind!

Notes: (1) “Leader of Mali military coup trained in U.S.” - Washington Post, March 23, 2012 (2) “U.N. council alarmed by al Qaeda presence in Mali” - Reuters, April 4, 2012 (3) Personal correspondence (4) “AFRICOM Senior Leader Visits Mali, Meets President”  - U.S. Africa Command, Feb. 29, 2008 -http://www.africom.mil/ getArticle.asp? art=1662&lang=0 (5) “Transparency in Mali” - U.S. Africa Command, March 6, 2008 - http://www.africom.mil/ africomDialogue.asp?entry=151& lang= (6) The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership – U.S. Africa Command -http://www.africom.mil/tsctp. asp (7) “Snapshot: Bamako, Mali” - U.S. Africa Command, May 27, 2010 -http://www.africom.mil/ africomDialogue.asp?entry= 1247&lang=0 (8) “U.S., Malian Military Medics Train to Save Lives”  - U.S. Africa Command, Feb. 10, 2012 - http://www.africom.mil/ getArticle.asp?art=7618&lang=0 (9) “Finally serious oil explorations in Mali” - Afrol News, Feb. 14, 2012 – http://www.afrol.com/articles/ 24339

 Defenders for Freedom, Justice & Equality l PO Box 23202, Richmond, VA 23223 – USA Web:www.DefendersFJE.org l Blog: www.DefendersFJE.blogspot.com l Email:DefendersFJE@hotmail.com Phone: 804-644-5834 l Fax: 804-332-5225

 

The coup in Mali appears to be over, and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso isleading talks on how to organize and move forward.

“Former parliament speaker Dioncounda Traoré was sworn in on Thursday as interim president after Amadou Toumani Touré resigned under the 6 April agreement.

The 70-year-old mathematician turned politician is expected to name a prime minister soon, and to organise elections within 40 days.

He has threatened “total war” against the northern rebels, who seized a vast swathe of territory amid the disarray that followed the 22 March coup, which the mutineers justified by accusing Touré’s government of mishandling the Tuareg rebellion.”

The following interview with Andy Morgan from March 27 provides knowledge, history, and insight regarding what is going on with the Tuareg uprising in Mali.

“Q: Could you give us the general picture of what is going on in Mali at the moment?
A: The Tuaregs have been fighting an insurgency against the central power in Mali since the late 1950s but in terms of open fighting, since 1963. So this is a very old story. What we are seeing is the latest chapter, but a chapter with a great many differences. The Tuaregs this time are better equipped, better trained and better led than they ever have been before and as a result they have been able to clinch a series of military victories which have given them control of the northern half of Mali …
…
Q: What about the AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)? Does this group exist and are there any links with the MNLA as some have suggested?
A: No Tuareg has ever killed or maimed another human being in the name of religion – certainly not in the last sixty years. I say that just to make clear that there is no cultural affinity between the Tuareg and AQIM. There is no question that AQIM does actually exist, this has been verified, but the more difficult question is who are its friends and enemies? They carry out kidnappings and have murdered people, including soldiers and policemen and have carried out suicide attacks. But there is a great deal of conjecture about this whole issue. What does certainly happen is that many western African and North African governments use Al Qaeda to discredit political or independence and autonomy movements.”

Here is the map of Mali from near the end of March.

Map of Mali with the MNLA claims and positions as of March 28, 2012, before the MNLA captured Timbuktu

An excerpt from The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali by Andy Morgan:

“Iyad Ag Ghali, Ansar Eddine and Mali-AQIM collusion theory

Iyad’s creation of Ansar Eddine and his reported ties with a certain Abou Abdelkarim aka Le Targui, one of the minor AQIM leaders operating in the southern desert, have opened the flood gates to national and international speculation about the possible links between the Tuareg rebel movement and Islamic terrorists, a link that the Malian government is all to keen to stoke and publicise in order to discredit the movement. As his name indicates, Abdelkarim le Targui is supposedly a Tuareg, a native of the Tinzawaten region and the erstwhile preacher at the mosque in In Khalil, a remote and fairly lawless border town in the far north east of Mali. He is reportedly a subordinate of the thuggish emir Abou Zeid, and leader of his own small katiba called Al Ansar which was responsible for kidnapping the septuagenarian French humanitarian worker Michel Germaneau in 2010. According to an announcement by Abdelmalik Droukdel, until recently the supreme leader of AQIM, which was posted up on the AQIM website, Abdelkarim Le Targui was also responsible for murdering Germaneau in cold blood as well as negotiation major drug deals on behalf of AQIM with the representatives of a Colombian drugs cartel in Guinea-Bissau. Not the kind of person you should be associating with if you want to present yourself as a legitimate political organisation.

Iyad’s association with Abdelkarim Le Targui is vague and conjectural. Some Tuareg even argue that far from being a true targui, Abdelkarim is an Algerian Arab, like all the other AQIM leaders in the southern desert. Nonetheless this link, together with the perceived religious extremism of Iyad and his Ansar Eddine movement, has spawned a smear campaign in Bamako which aims to convince the world that the MNLA are in cahoots with AQIM. The AFP reporter in Bamako even claimed that Abou Zeid took part in a recent MNLA attack on the army in the village of Aguel’hoc north of Kidal. Nothing is more poisonous to the international image of the Tuareg cause than this taint of fundamentalism and AQIM, not even the Gaddafi links.

There are several reasons why that taint is wholly unjustified. The first is that since the inception of the MNA and MNLA movements, one of their loudest, most cherished and oft repeated aims is to rid their homeland of AQIM, an organisation which they consider to be one of Mali’s most effective weapons in its fight against their cause. “AQIM was parachuted in and installed in our territory by the Malian government,” declares Hama Ag Sid’Ahmed, with total conviction. “It was the initiative of certain drugs barons, who are advisors to the President, in the shadows of the Koulouba Palace [The Presidential palace in Bamako]. They brought them into the Timbuktu region and then to Kidal. In return for the release of the 32 hostages in 2003, a pact of non-aggression was signed between Bamako and Al Qaeda, who then progressively occupied this territory. Those contacts became permanent and it’s clear that since then all the operations led by the terrorist groups have originated in Mali, and the terrorist have always fallen back to Mali. It’s their safe haven. Everyone knows that the terrorists are in communication with military leaders, and that politicians from Bamako meet the terrorist emirs quite regularly.”

Far fetched? Maybe. Like Professor Jeremy Keenan’s controversial theory that AQIM are a creation of the Algerian DRS, the Mali-AQIM collusion theory remains conjectural. But the circumstantial evidence that links a cabal of Malian army and secret service operatives, usually Arabs from the north of the country close to the upper echelons of Mali’s political and military hierarchy, to the huge drug smuggling operations that have blighted the stability of the northern deserts in recent years and to AQIM is very strong. It’s hardly a secret anymore that a consensus exists among US, French and Algerian diplomats in the region that Mali has been long on words but short on action in its dealings with AQIM since 2006. The frustration with Mali’s lack of firm resolve and decisive action in this regard, despite the millions of dollars in aid that it has received from the US and France specifically for the purpose of fighting terrorists on its soil, has been growing exponentially in the embassies and foreign ministries of the world powers. Apart from one clash with AQIM in the desert north of Timbuktu back in 2006, there have hardly been any confirmed reports of the Malian army doing any damage to AQIM at all. In fact, the most determined opposition that AQIM has encountered during its five year campaign of terror in Mali has been at the hands of the ADC, the Tuareg rebel movement launched in 2006, who skirmished with the terrorists several times between 2006 and 2009, with lives lost on both sides. And now that the entire might of the Malian army has been thrown against the Tuareg uprising with such devastating force, including fighter jets, tanks, armoured vehicles, missiles of every stamp and thousands of troops, it’s little wonder that Tuaregs, diplomats, analysts and commentators are feeling a tad cynical about Mali’s repeated assertions in recent years that they’ve never had the military wherewithal to deal with the AQIM threat.

A senior Malian politician once had the temerity to declare in a private meeting at the US Embassy in Bamako that the presence of AQIM in the north east of the country was a good thing, as long as it meant that the Tuareg rebel movement wasted its resources and time trying to combat it. At another meeting, the new Algerian ambassador informed his US counterpart that he suspected collusion between Mali and the terrorists. He cited the then recent case of a joint Algerian-Malian operation to attack an AQIM base that had failed because the AQIM katiba in question had been tipped off in advance. All these frankly startling revelations are contained in the US Embassy cables leaked by Bradley Manning and Wikileaks. In fact, there is no better way to understand what really went on in the northern deserts of Mali between 2006 and early 2010 than to read those US Embassy cables. The level of intelligence, analysis and research contained in them is often of the highest order. And yes, they do reveal that the US Embassy has also suspected Mali of at best tolerating and at worst colluding with AQIM at one time or another.

If the implantation of AQIM on Tuareg soil was part of a deliberate Malian strategy, then it has been extraordinarily effective. The main campaign of AQIM kidnapping and extortion began in March 2008 (interestingly there had been a five year hiatus since the 2003 hostage incident), just when relations between Mali, the ADC and Ag Bahanga were reaching their nadir. Since that time AQIM has knocked the Tuareg rebellion squarely off the front page, both national and internationally. Until January 17 of this year that is. The presence of AQIM in Mali put the country in the front line of the USA’s global war on terror, giving it kudos and a receptive ear in Washington whilst justifying the huge amounts of money, training and equipment that America lavished on Mali in the context of its Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Programme (TSCTP) and Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). It has also emptied the north of foreign journalists, foreign observers, foreign NGO workers, foreign tourists and foreigners in general, whose presence could have been inconvenient for certain shady army or secret service (DGSE) operations, especially those linked with the drug trade. Most of all, AQIM have simply throttled the region and deprived its Tuareg population of any hope of building a viable future and developing a strong economy. In short, AQIM has crippled Tuareg society in Mali’s north east. No wonder MNLA have vowed to rid their land of Al Qaeda.

And yet Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar Eddine movement continues to sow the seeds of doubt and Mali’s propaganda machine continues to milk any possible connection between the MNLA, Iyad and AQIM for all its worth. Apparently Iyad tried to sell his plan for an Islamic inspired movement to the Ifoghas meeting in Abeibara by promising that his political approach would be no different to that of the moderate Islamic parties that have come to power following the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. There also happens to be another Islamic organisation in Mali with the name Ansar Dine. It has a vast following amongst southern Malians, who flock to football stadiums in their thousands to hear the preachings of the movement’s leader, Cherif Ousmane Madani Haidara. Ansar Dine preaches tolerance, democracy and social morality inspired by faith in the teachings of The Prophet. It is also an ardent critic of government corruption and incompetence. Perhaps Iyad sees his movement as a Tamasheq off shoot of the bigger Ansar Dine. Who knows? “What’s very important is that all the religious leaders of the Adagh des Iforas have categorically rejected this foreign Salafist culture that has been planted in their midst,” Hama Ag Sid’Ahmed declares with emphasis. “I know that Iyad is an important person in the region and I know that he’s involved in religious matters. But I cannot believe that he would completely abandon the tolerance that is part of our Tuareg culture. Not for one second. Maybe Iyad and others realise that AQIM has a hold on some of our young people, and they’re trying to present a different message about Islam that might possibly win back all those that the Salafists have co-opted into their ranks.”’

There is also this article that is worth noting:Terrorism In The Sahara And Sahel: A ‘False Flag’ In The War On Terror? – by Richard Trillo

“Some Sahara analysts believe that AQIM, which was formed in 2007, is a false flag organisation. In this scenario, many of AQIM’s members may be genuine Islamic ideologues from Algeria, with a background in the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that were formed after the cancellation of Algeria’s 1991 elections in which the Islamic Salvation Front won a sweeping victory. The activities of these AQIM ground troops, however, are said to be coordinated by none other than the Algerian intelligence service itself, in a strategy aimed at justifying the country’s authoritarian government, procuring arms and drawing their American military partners into the region in the “Global War on Terror” (there is a significant American military presence in the Sahel, notably a large US training base at Gao, in Mali).”

And a comment to the article says:

“I was in Mauritania spring 2009. On June 25 (2009, not 2010) Christopher Leggett, a husband and father of four, was shot multiple times. Leggett was an American aid worker teaching computer classes. At the time AQIM issued statement: “Two knights of the Islamic Maghreb killed Christopher Leggett for his Chistianizing activities”. Soon after more than 100 Peace Corps volunteers were evacuated to Senegal. (The Peace Corp had worked in Mauritania 40+ yrs)
In Novemeber 2009 AQIM also kidnapped three Spanish aid workers in Mauritania…

Agree, the operations of AQIM appear focused on running blackmarket opperations (smuggling, drugs, money-laundering & protection rackets). It appears to me AQIM does not want witnesses, foreign observers, especially those trusted by locals. Leggett and the three Spanish aid workers were neither political targets nor ransom targets (corporate engineers/execs).

AQIM violence not only drove off tourists, but also aid workers… which may have been their objective.”

Outsiders who are trusted by local residents might bring back reports of what is really happening. Those with a political agenda might want the outside to know of their deeds when they are effective. They may have less to hide. Those with a criminal agenda might want to prevent any whiff of real information from reaching the wider world. They may have much more to hide.

Here is more from the interview with Andy Morgan in Global Dispatches on the subject of Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion.

“From about October 2011 onwards, they basically started preparing the uprising, with long meetings out in the desert where they indulged in a great deal of soul searching about what had gone wrong in previous uprisings, so as to get it right this time. What happened is that they entered into an alliance with a much younger group of Tuaregs, you might say young intellectuals, very Internet savvy young Tuaregs, who set up the National Movement of Azawad, the MNA at the end of 2010. They eventually merged with the MNLA. This was an important move as one of the aspects that was deemed to be lacking in previous uprisings was good communications with the international media, and with the world at large.
…
Q: When we talk about Tuaregs we are talking about many different tribes, spread over different countries. Some say the MNLA is just a small group of a few thousand fighters. What sort of support does the MNLA have from Tuaregs as a whole?
A: There are roughly 1.5 million Tuaregs, although an accurate census does not exist. They are spread out over 5 countries: Mali, Algeria, Libya, Niger and Burkina Faso. They have a very complex clan and tribal structure, at the top of which you have 5 large confederations which are then broken down into tribes, then clans and families etc. It’s very complex. They don’t all see eye-to-eye and historically they have fought against each other, sometimes very bitterly. The idea of a Tuareg identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. Up till about 50 years ago, they did not see themselves as a unified people, they saw themselves as different families, tribes and clans – nomads from different parts of the desert who often fought against each other.

Q: So who are the MNLA?
A: The MNLA are basically led by Tuaregs from the north-east of Mali, especially by two particular clans, called the Iforas and Idnan. The Iforas are the traditional rulers of north-eastern Mali. The Idnan are also a traditional warrior clan, bearing in mind that their society is very hierarchical and each clan had its different role. All of these old structures have been modified and deconstructed over the last one hundred years, but basically these two groups, the Iforas and the Idnan, are very much at the head of the MNLA. Support for the MNLA amongst Tuaregs is quite broad, partly as a result of the MNA’s propaganda and certainly before this latest conflict happened, I got the feeling from talking to various friends, that a lot of Tuaregs felt that at last they had a rebel organisation that was worthy of their cause. However they do not represent all Tuaregs by any means, and even less, all the people living in the north of Mali, where there are quite a number of different ethnicities apart from the Tuareg, including Arabs, Songhai and Peulh. All I can say is that it’s been along time since a rebel movement has enjoyed the level of support that the MNLA have, but this support is by no means universal.

Q: Is there any internal opposition?
A: There is one group that is seemingly opposed to the MNLA and they are called the Inghad. They are the former subordinate or ‘vassal’ class in the old hierarchical structure, subordinate to the more noble Idnan and Iforas Tuaregs. Many of the Inghad were in favour of the Tuareg lands becoming part of the Republic of Mali, as the socialist principles upon which the Malian Republic was built meant that they were freed from their subservient status in Tuareg society. One of the most frequently touted names in this conflict is a Tuareg military commander called Colonel al-Hajj Gamou. He has been the Malian army’s champion in the north-east for quite a number of years and he is an Inghad, from one of these vassal tribes. Ag Gamou has been built up as the defender of the Malian cause in the north. Apart from the Libyan Tuareg presence in the MNLA, there have also been a lot of desertions to the MNLA from the Malian army since December, as the Malian army did comprise a large number of Tuaregs. The actual number of people in the MNLA is difficult to gauge but I am sure that the numbers are growing.

Q: What are the aims of the MNLA?
A: They want a country of their own, a country called Azawad, which will comprise the three northernmost provinces or regions of present-day Mali – Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. There has long been a debate within Tuareg society about what they want; autonomy within a federalist Malian structure or a completely independent state. After the last big rebellion in the early 1990s, when the suffering among the civilian population was quite extreme, many Tuaregs fell back to a more conciliatory position, saying that they did not want an independent country but wanted their rights; cultural rights and economic rights. This position has hardened in recent years to the point where the MNLA want absolute independence for Azawad, the long-dreamed-of Tuareg state.
…By saying that they are only interested in Mali, the MNLA are trying to limit the fear and concern of neighbouring states that a Tuareg uprising in Mali will lead to Tuareg uprisings elsewhere in all the 5 other countries where Tuareg are present.“

Morgan continues to describe in more detail why the nearby countries are extremely nervous about the situation. He speaks about the reasons for the coup, and the very real grievances the Malian military had against their government. He discusses the origin and nature of Ansar al Din, and the links and frictions between it and the MNLA, and the AQIM. Morgan describes how AQIM’s kidnapping and drug running destroyed tourism and related business in northern Mali. This led to bad feelings towards AQIM. Morgan discusses how during peaceful times, Malians and the Tuareg generally get along pretty well. And he discusses the tensions between Mali and Mauritania.

Ansar al Din probably caused Alexandra at Libya360 to write:

“I have been expressing concern for Tuareg for several months. My research uncovered two parallel movements. One, a genuine uprising of the Tuareg. The other, an imperialist-backed initiative aimed and manufacturing consent for the takeover of another African nation and the genocide of the Tuareg.

The US and the French have had their Special Operations forces in northern Mali and neighboring countries for most of this century, and the French long before that. The French have been particularly active in Niger. The US has used this time to create a decade of lies in order to establish the GWOT in the Sahara and give some legitimacy to AQIM in order to justify anti-terrorism.”

Moeen Raoof writes:

“The conflict in Libya has had a devastating effect in Niger and Mali where the nomadic Tuareg peoples in the Sahara Desert regions of northern Niger and Mali and southern Libya have been involved in a spate of kidnappings and armed uprisings known as the ‘Tuareg rebellion’. This is especially dangerous for northern Niger in and around the town of Arlit, an industrial town located in the Agadez region, where uranium is mined by French companies in two large uranium mines (Arlit and Akouta).
…
Put simply, this is about Uranium to be found in the Tuareg areas of Mali, Niger and Libya, the next step will be UN/ECOWAS/NATO Peace-keepers, Military intervention and killing of thousands of Tuaregs.”

Not only is uranium an issue, oil is in the picture as well. As Andy Morgan puts it:

“Q: What about oil and gas? Is the area strategic in terms of its mineral resources?
A: Yes, one thing that has been happening in the last 5 years is that northern Mali has been explored, and parcelled off as lots for oil drilling. Those lots have already been sold off – and I should say this is where things get very murky and where some serious investigative journalism needs to be done. Total, the French oil company, were involved in the exploration, as were the Qatar Petroleum Company. As we know, both Qatar and France were heavily involved in the overthrow of Gaddafi and many Malian commentators see a conspiracy theory in which France (remembering that France and the Tuaregs did try and set up a Tuareg state back in the ’50s prior to Malian independence which was quashed by the FLN in Algeria and the leaders of independent Mali) have always rued the fact that they lost all their colonies and access to the rich minerals in northern Mali. So many Malians see the Tuareg rebellion as being engineered by the French.”

Energypedia provides an outline of Mali’s oil blocks, and this piece of information from October 2011:

“Algerian state energy group Sonatrach will start long-awaited drilling for oil in Mali’s section of the Taoudeni Basin by mid-2012, the company’s managing director said on Malian state radio. Sonatrach signed a deal for oil exploration in Mali in 2007, but progress has been slow in the basin, which straddles Mali, Algeria and Mauritania. The area is overrun by gunmen, some of whom are linked to al Qaeda”

The Taoudeni Basin in Mali, which extends far into Mauritania, and somewhat into Algeria, is thought to be the location of significant reserves of oil.

There is an interview with a spokesman for the MNLA from March 28 at Afrik.comMNLA : « L’indépendance ne se donne pas, elle se mérite, google translation here. Mossa Ag Attach, communications officer for the MNLA tells us in the interview that the MNLA is determined to control (free) the three northern cities, Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. He indicates the MNLA is happy to negotiate so long as the government of Mali will respect Azawad independence. You can check for more from the source at theMNLA website.

The international community is hyping the threat of terror, linking it to the Tuareg victories in the north of Mali. But if Mali’s army and political elite have been a more active partners and participants with AQIM’s drug smuggling and criminal endeavors, the Tuareg may make life more difficult for AQIM, and cost some big people money. Also, how does the quest for oil and uranium interact with AQIM’s criminal endeavors?

The north of Mali is hostile and unfamiliar to soldiers from the south. ECOWAS has spoken of sending troups, but getting actual troop commitments is chancy, and no way guaranteed.

If the upper echelons of Mali’s army and political elite are allied with AQIM, and the US knows this, then all the train and equip is another example of the US knowinglypartnering with the perpetrators, and actively concealing the truth. What is the goal of such a policy?

 

 

Be sure to read the entire article, The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali by Andy Morgan. I only included a small portion here. He covers many more aspects of the recent history and the present situation.
Check the interview as well Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion.

Earlier posts relevant to this topic:Inherent contradictions of AFRICOM – lies and illusions
US Policy Versus Democracy In Mali
Lied Into the War On Terror In the Sahara
New York Times catapults the propganda for AFRICOM
Obama’s African Rifles – Partners/Surrogates/Proxies
Supplying Arms and Military Training – The US Gift to Africa

h/t David/Daoud
h/t Joerg Tiedjen
for informative links